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Abstract. Decision makers frequently have a spokesperson communicate their decisions.
In this paper, we address two questions. First, does it matter who communicates an unfair
decision? Second, does it matter how the unfair decision is communicated? We conduct
a modified dictator game experiment in which either the decision maker or a spokesper-
son communicates the decided allocation to recipients, who then determine whether to
punish either of them. We find that receivers punish both the decision maker and the
spokesperson more often, and more heavily, for unfair allocations communicated by the
spokesperson if there is room for shifting blame. The increased punishment results from
the messenger’s style of delivery: spokespersons are more likely than decision makers to
express emotional regret instead of rational need. Receivers seem to punish the former
style of communication because they view it as an attempt to shift blame. Our results
establish more generally that the design of communication schemes shapes relationships
among organizational members.
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1. Introduction
Dating back to Sophocles and Plutarch, the communi-
cation of bad news has been considered an unpleas-
ant task entailing shame and personal distress. At the
same time, leaders are required to make unpleasant
or unfair decisions that must be communicated to the
affected parties.1 One way to avoid the emotional dis-
tress induced by communicating bad news (Tesser and
Rosen 1975, Folger and Skarlicki 2001) is to delegate
such communication to another person. For instance,
companies may appoint an external consultant to com-
municate a bad outcome to their workers (Brown
2007).2 Similarly, politicians may avoid communicating
unpopular decisions to the media and instead dele-
gate that task. It remains unknown, however, whether
affected individuals react differently to delegated ver-
sus direct communication.
In this study, we use a lab experiment to explore
two key questions: Do recipient responses differ as a
function of (i) who communicates the negative decision
or of (ii) how that decision is communicated? To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study to address both
the delegation of communication and the responses of
those negatively affected by a decision.
Existing studies separately analyze why people del-
egate decision rights (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001,
Bolton and Dewatripont 2005, Hamman et al. 2010,
Coffman 2011, Bartling and Fischbacher 2012, Oexl
and Grossman 2013) and how communication affects
perceived fairness (Yamamori et al. 2008, Andreoni
and Rao 2011, Greiner et al. 2012).3 In bridging these
two strands of research on the delegation of deci-
sion rights and communication, our paper analyzes
receivers’ responses to the delegated communication of a
negative decision in a laboratory experiment.
The setup involves a decision maker who makes a
fair or unfair decision that affects her own earnings
and the earnings of other participants. The decision
maker (DM) can either communicate this decision to
the others or delegate a spokesperson to assume that
duty. The spokesperson (SP) is not responsible for—
but is affected by—the DM’s decision; it is her task (if
delegated) to communicate the decision already made
by the decision maker. The response of affected indi-
viduals depends on the DM’s allocation choice and on
the messenger’s communication style. We employ this
setup to study (i) whether those who are negatively
affected by a decision react differently depending on
3911
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who communicates the decision (i.e., DM or SP) and
(ii) whether affected individuals (i.e., receivers) react
differently depending on how the decision is communi-
cated (i.e., onwhat communication style themessenger
adopts). So that we can disentangle the respective
influence of the source and the style of a commu-
nicated message, we use preformulated communica-
tion expressing emotional regret or rational need.4 We
implement a 3× 2 experimental design whereby, in the
second dimension, receivers can punish the DM and
the SP independently versus having to punish them
with the same amount. Thus, the treatments include
versus exclude the possibility to shift blame between
DM and SP.
Receivers’ responses to an unfair allocation and the
corresponding communication style—in terms of their
punishment decisions—are affected by several factors.5
Our experimental design addresses primarily the role
of shifting blame rather than responsibility, and how
the individuals affected by an unfair allocation per-
ceive that role; thus, we focus on cases in which the
decision maker chooses the unfair allocation. Whereas
the delegation of communication and the expression
of emotional regret may, under independent punish-
ment, be perceived as an (irresponsible) attempt to shift
blame, that perception is not observed under same
punishment.
Affected individuals (receivers) may take into ac-
count the source (DM or SP) and style (emotional
or rational) of the message communicating an unfair
decision. However, the delegating of communication
may shift the attention of those affected from the
DM responsible for an unfair allocation to some other
person who is not actually to blame for that deci-
sion (Kahneman 1973). An extreme instance is that
of individuals blaming others for events—such as the
outcome of a lottery—for which the latter could not
possibly be responsible (Gurdal et al. 2013). Under
independent punishment, the delegation of commu-
nication and the communication style (i.e., express-
ing emotional regret) may be intended to shift blame
and/or be perceived as such. Under same punishment,
however, blame cannot be shifted because the DM and
the SP must be punished equally.6
Not only the receivers but also the spokesperson
will likely react to the DM’s unfair allocation choice
and decision to delegate the communication of that
choice. One might well expect that SPs express emo-
tional regret more frequently in reaction to the DM’s
delegation decision per se or to her possibly blame-
shifting motivation for communicating indirectly.
We find that outcomes are not affected by communi-
cation source (decision maker or spokesperson) when
we control for communication style. In contrast, out-
comes are affected by the style of communication—but
only if there is room for shifting the blame; here, we
control for the messenger. In this case, receivers punish
both DM and SP more in response to expressions of
emotional regret (for an unfair decision) than to expres-
sions of rational need. Thus, outcomes are affected by
the context in which communication occurs.
These conclusions reflect receivers punishing more
frequently and more heavily when communication of
an unfair split is delegated and blame can be assigned
(treatments with independent punishment). However,
receivers do not punish in response to the delegation
itself. One possible explanation is a chain effect: when
the DM decides to delegate communication, the SP
responds to that decision by choosing the emotional
regret message rather than the rational need message.
As already indicated, receivers punish both DMand SP
more often and more strongly when an unfair split is
communicated via the emotional regret message. Yet,
if there is no room for shifting blame, then neither
the fact of delegation nor the style of communication
affects the punishment meted out by receivers (treat-
ments with same punishment).
In short, our results indicate that the context in
which communication takes place is crucial. If blame
can be assigned independently, then the response of
receivers depends on the style of communication; if
there is no room for shifting the blame, then neither
the source nor the style of communication affects par-
ticipants’ outcomes.
2. The Experiment
In Section 2.1, we describe the experimental design and
our general procedure. In Section 2.2, we discuss in
detail the six treatments employed in our experiment.
2.1. Experimental Design and Procedure
For our lab experiment, we use the basic setup de-
scribed in Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) but with
three important differences. First, we do not allow for
delegation of decision rights (which the DM retains
throughout). Second, the decision must be commu-
nicated. Third, the decision maker can communi-
cate the allocation herself or delegate that task to a
spokesperson.
At the beginning of the experiment, participants
are randomly divided into groups of four players.7
(See Online Appendix D for the experiment’s general
instructions.) In each group, there are three types of
players, whose roles are randomly assigned to partic-
ipants: one decision maker (dictator), one spokesper-
son, and two receivers.
The procedure consists of three steps: (1) choos-
ing how to allocate the initial endowment, (2) decid-
ing how to communicate that choice, and (3) admin-
istering punishment. In the first step, the DM must
choose either a fair or an unfair allocation of her initial
e20 endowment. The fair allocation assigns e5 to each
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group member; the unfair allocation assigns e9 each to
DM and SP but only e1 each to receivers.
Next, depending on the treatment, either the deci-
sion maker or the spokesperson must communicate
the former’s allocation choice. If the DM delegates
communication to the SP, then it becomes his duty
to communicate the decision maker’s allocation choice
to the receivers by choosing one of two preformu-
lated sentences (see Online Appendix E). Whoever
communicates the allocation decision is not apprised
of the required preformulated sentences—which are
nearly identical for DM and SP—until this stage of the
experiment is reached. We formulated two sentences
each for communicating the fair and unfair allocation
choices using the categories most frequently employed
by Andreoni and Rao (2011). For the fair allocation, the
sentences refer either to the allocation’s fairness or to
the greatly reduced earnings (as compared with the
alternative allocation) of the decision maker and the
spokesperson. For the unfair allocation, the sentences
express either emotional regret or rational need (the
latter combined with a “you’d do it, too” appeal).8
It might well have been preferable to allow free-form
communication, but that approach was impractical
given the very high number of possibilities the commu-
nication set would then have to encompass. Moreover,
free-form messages would have made it impossible to
disentangle the effect of who communicates from the
effect of how the unfair allocation is communicated. By
offering two communication options, we address the
latter objective—which is our main research goal—by
allowing the communicator to choose (at least in a rudi-
mentary sense) the style of communication even as we
retain control over the style options. We will analyze
the pure effects of (i) how receivers view a particular
communication source (DM versus SP), and (ii) how
receivers view a particular communication style (emo-
tional regret versus rational need).
Finally, the two receivers learn what allocation was
chosen (fair or unfair), who communicated that deci-
sion (DM or SP), and the style of communication (emo-
tional or rational). In response, each receiver decides
whether or not to financially punish the decision
maker and/or the spokesperson and also chooses on
the intensity of that punishment (i.e., the size of the
penalty). In particular, receivers can decide to pay e1
so that the DM’s and the SP’s payoffs are reduced by
as much as e3.50 each (values between e0 and e3.50
in intervals of e0.50; maximum total penalty of e7).
Receivers can also decide to punish less than e3.50 per
player (but do not retain the difference); the e1 fee
for punishing is fixed and so is independent of the
penalty amounts that receivers assess on the DM’s and
the SP’s earnings.9 After the two receivers have inde-
pendently made their punishment decisions, the pun-
ishment by one of the (randomly chosen) receivers is
applied. (The other receiver’s decision has no effect on
anyone’s earnings.) We are interested in the receivers’
punishment responses to unfair allocations. Because
we expect some decision makers to choose the fair allo-
cation, we put two receivers in each group; in that
waywe obtain twice asmany punishment observations
as allocation choices, which helps compensate for the
reduced number of interesting punishment decisions.
This approach also allows us to keep the sum of payoffs
(e20) constant across allocation choices.
Our setup features a one-shot game in which the
total earnings of the decision maker and of the spo-
kesperson are given by the allocation payoffs (e9 or
e5 each) minus whatever punishment is assessed by
the randomly chosen receiver. The total earnings of the
receivers are given by the allocation payoffs (e1 or e5
each) minus the cost for punishing (e1) for a receiver
who decides to punish and whose decision is the one
(randomly) chosen.
The decision maker and the receivers’ (self-inter-
ested) payoff-maximizing decisions are as follows. Be-
cause the DM cannot be penalized more than e3.50,
she is always better off choosing the unfair alloca-
tion: assigning e9 each to herself and the spokesperson
and e1 to each of the two receivers. Payoff-maximiz-
ing receivers should never punish because doing so
reduces their earnings.
We conducted the experiment at Spain’s Universi-
tat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) and Universitat de
Valencia (UV) during April–November 2013.10 Most
participants were UAB and UV undergraduates re-
cruited by e-mail via the ORSEE online recruitment
system (Greiner 2004), where they had voluntarily reg-
istered to participate in experiments. No subject was
allowed to participate in more than one experimen-
tal session. A total of 868 participants took part in the
experiment, and they earned e9.43 on average (this
amount includes a participation fee of e5 per subject).
Subjects were paid privately, in cash, after the experi-
ment. Sessions ran slightly less than an hour, on aver-
age, including instructions and payment. We used z-
Tree software (Fischbacher 2007) to program and con-
duct the experiment.
2.2. Treatments
We run a total of six treatments: one main treatment
and five control treatments. Table 1 summarizes the
characteristics as well as the number of observations
(groups) and number of groups with unfair allocations
for each treatment.
In the main treatment (voluntary delegation with
independent punishment), the decision maker chooses
whether to communicate the allocation directly or
instead to delegate that task to the spokesperson; then,
the receivers decide whether to punish the DM and/or
the SP and by what amounts (independent punish-
ment). In other words, receivers can punish the SP or
Garofalo and Rott: Shifting Blame? Experimental Evidence of Delegating Communication
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Table 1. Overview of Treatments
No. of No. of groups with
Treatment Communication delegation Punishment groups unfair allocation
Main treatment
Voluntary delegation DM decides who communicates Receiver’s punishment amount for 45 22
Independent punishment (DM or SP) the allocation decision DM and SP can be different
to receivers
Control treatments
No delegation DM communicates allocation Receiver’s punishment amount for 33 21
Independent punishment decision to receivers DM and SP can be different
Mandatory delegation SP communicates allocation Receiver’s punishment amount for 32 20
Independent punishment decision to receivers DM and SP can be different
Voluntary delegation DM decides who communicates Receiver’s punishment amount for 43 31
Same punishment (DM or SP) the allocation decision DM and SP has to be the same
to receivers
No delegation DM communicates allocation Receiver’s punishment amount for 32 19
Same punishment decision to receivers DM and SP has to be the same
Mandatory delegation SP communicates allocation Receiver’s punishment amount for 32 21
Same punishment decision to receivers DM and SP has to be the same
Total 217 134
Note. DM (SP) stands for decision maker (spokesperson).
the DM or both (or neither), and the extent of punish-
ment need not be equal for those two parties.
The five control treatments vary along two dimen-
sions: we adopt two other communication forms (in
addition to voluntary delegation) and one other pun-
ishment form (in addition to independentpunishment).
With regard to communication, its delegation (or not) is
exogenously determined by the treatment.More specif-
ically, the DM may be required to communicate her
decision directly (no delegation) or to insist that the
spokesperson communicates that decision (mandatory
delegation). We run each treatment for same punish-
ment and independent punishment both.
When same punishment applies, receivers who pun-
ish must treat DM and SP the same: only both or
neither can be punished. So a receiver who wants to
punish the decision maker by cutting (say) e2 from
her earnings must also cut e2 from the spokesperson’s
earnings. Recall that, under both punishment forms
(same and independent), the two receivers each make
their own decisions about punishment.
Concerning receivers’ punishment of the messenger,
our design allows us to compare the effect of different
message sources while holding the style of communi-
cation constant. We expect to find more and greater
punishment when the SP, rather than the DM, com-
municates allocations in the treatment with voluntary
delegation and independent punishment because the
receivers perceive the delegated communication of an
unfair allocation as an attempt to shift blame; we also
expect more and greater punishment in the mandatory
delegation with independent punishment treatment
than in the no delegation with independent punish-
ment treatment. We furthermore expect to find no
differences in punishment under delegation in treat-
ments with same punishment because blame cannot be
shifted in those treatments.
Concerning receivers’ punishment of the commu-
nication style, our experimental design allows us to
compare the effect of how the communicator (DM or
SP) delivers the message. We expect to find more and
greater punishment in response to the expression of
emotional regret (as compared with rational need) in
all three treatments with independent punishment, but
we expect to find no punishment differences in all
three treatments with same punishment. The reason is
that blame can be shifted (and perceived negatively) in
treatments with independent punishment, but it can-
not be shifted in treatments with same punishment.
If the spokesperson views delegated communication
as blame shifting, then he will more often choose
a message that expresses emotional regret, hoping
thereby to shift the blame back on the decision maker.
We therefore expect to find the expression of emotional
regret more often (than rational need) in the treatment
with voluntary delegation and independent punish-
ment than in the treatment with mandatory delegation
and independent punishment or with voluntary dele-
gation and same punishment. A detailed explanation
of the treatments and how they compare with each
other can be found in Appendix A.
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Subjects were assigned randomly to one of the
six treatments (between-subject design). There are
217 independent groups in total, distributed as shown
in Table 1.11 Observations from UAB (93 groups) and
UV (124 groups) are distributed more or less equally
among the six treatments, with the former institu-
tion accounting for 38%–51% of the observations per
treatment.12
3. Results
As already indicated, we focus on receivers’ punish-
ment behavior and spokespersons’ communication
strategies in the event of an unfair allocation choice by
the decision maker. Of all 217 DMs, 134 (62%) choose
the unfair allocation composed by 22 (49% of 45) and
up to 31 (72% of 43) in treatments voluntary delegation
with independent and same punishment, respectively;
see Table 1. For those DMs who choose the unfair allo-
cation, the percentage of delegators more than doubles
compared to DMs who choose the fair allocation in the
treatments with voluntary delegation. A detailed anal-
ysis of the DMs’ allocation and delegation choices is
provided in Appendix C.
Across all six treatments, we have 268 punishment
observations (receivers’ reaction), 70 communication
style observations (spokespersons’ message choice),
and 64 communication style observations by deci-
sion makers. Separately analyzing each treatment and
controlling for style of communication or messenger
leads in some cases to a small number of observations
per cell. We address this issue in the analysis to fol-
low. Unless differently specified, the reported p-values
come from two-sided Fisher’s exact tests.
In Section 3.1, we present and discuss results related
to receivers’ punishment of delegated communication
(i.e., who communicates the unfair allocation); in Sec-
tion 3.2, we analyze receivers’ punishment of the com-
munication style (i.e., how the unfair allocation is com-
municated). Finally, Section 3.3 compares DMs’ and
SPs’ communication styles across treatments.
3.1. Receivers’ Punishment of
Delegating Communication
Self-interested andpayoff-maximizing receivers should
never punish either the decision maker or the spokes-
person if, as in our design, punishing is costly. Even so,
receivers use the punishment tool—and significantly
more often when the DM chooses the unfair allocation
than when she chooses the fair split, confirming pre-
vious findings of inequality aversion in dictator games
with punishment.13
3.1.1. Receivers’ Punishment Frequency: Delegation.
The punishment frequencies reflect the share of re-
ceivers who give up e1 for the chance to reduce
DM’s and/or SP’s earnings. Under independent pun-
ishment, delegating the communication of an unfair
















No del No delVol del Vol delMan del Man del
No del No delNo del lDel Del No del Del Del
Ind punish Same punish
Rational need Emotional regret
Notes. This figure reports—for unfair allocations—the punishment
frequency by delegation, by treatment, and by communication
style. The left (right) side gives results under independent (same)
punishment.
allocation significantly increases the punishment fre-
quency: from 45% (29 of 64) to 66% (41 of 62)
(p  0.021).14 Under the same punishment regime, in
contrast, the delegation of communicating an unfair
allocation has no effect on the punishment frequency:
56% (36 of 64) without and 51% (40 of 78) with delega-
tion (p  0.613).
However, the pure effect (on punishment) of del-
egating communication cannot be analyzed unless
we control for the communication styles employed
by decision maker and spokesperson. Figure 1 plots,
by treatment, receivers’ punishment frequency—in re-
sponse to an unfair allocation—for delegated and non-
delegated communication that contains an emotional
versus a rational explanation. In our main treatment—
i.e., voluntary delegation and independent punish-
ment (leftmost two bars in the figure)—we cannot tell
whether delegating communication alters the amounts
by which the DM and/or SP are punished while con-
trolling for the style of communication. The reason is
that, in this treatment, all decision makers choose the
rational need message and all spokespersons choose
the emotional regret message. We therefore pool the
data over delegation and communication style (emo-
tional versus rational). We examine communication
styles more closely in Section 3.2.
Under independent punishment (left side of Fig-
ure 1), the delegation of communication does not affect
punishment frequency: 75% (6 of 8) of receivers who
receive the emotional regret message from the decision
maker and 69% (33 of 48) of receivers who receive that
same message from the spokesperson decide to pun-
ish (p  1.000).15 For the rational need message, 41%
(23 of 56) and 57% (8 of 14) of receivers decided to
punish when this message was received from the DM
and SP, respectively (p  0.370 for the same treatments
Garofalo and Rott: Shifting Blame? Experimental Evidence of Delegating Communication
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pooled to test emotional regret). Examining separately
each communication style under exogenous communi-
cation assignment confirms that neither does the com-
munication source make a difference (p > 0.528).
Under same punishment (right side of Figure 1),
again the delegation of communication does not affect
punishment frequency; when we control for communi-
cation style (emotional versus rational), the difference
between punishment frequencies—that is, with and
without delegation—is not significant. For the emo-
tional regret message, the punishment frequencies are
65% (13 of 20) without delegation and 50% (20 of 40)
with delegation; for the rational need message, the
punishment frequencies are 52% (23 of 44) without
delegation and 53% (20 of 38) with delegation;16 these
differences are statistically not significant. Analyzing
each style (emotional versus rational) separately under
exogenous communication assignment, the messenger
does not affect punishment (p > 0.259).
3.1.2. Receivers’ Punishment Intensity: Delegation.
Here, we analyze the intensity of punishment ad-
ministered by receivers. Punishment “intensity” is the
amountofpenalty (reduction in earnings) that receivers
assess the decision maker and the spokesperson—that
is, the average punishment amount over all receivers
(including those who decide not to punish). Looking at
receiverbehavior in the three treatments featuring inde-
pendent punishment (i.e., thosewith voluntary delega-
tion, no delegation, andmandatory delegation), we see
that receivers reduce theDM’searningsbye1.58and the
SP’s earnings by e1.14. This difference is statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level (p < 0.000; two-sided Wilcoxon
signed-rank test) and confirms that receivers hold the
DM responsible for an unfair allocation and, accord-
ingly, punish her more than the spokesperson.17 Under
the three samepunishment treatments (i.e., with volun-
tary delegation, no delegation, and mandatory delega-
tion), receivers assign an average punishment of e1.53
each to the decisionmaker and the spokesperson.18
We now turn our attention to the pure effect of del-
egation on punishment—that is, while controlling for
communication style. Figure 2 gives an overview of the
receivers’ average punishment response to the expres-
sion of rational need and emotional regret messages
by the communication source and style, by punish-
ment forms. A figure displaying the receivers’ average
punishment amount for each treatment is provided in
Appendix B. In Figure 2, all light-gray (dark-gray) bars
plot the average punishment amount assigned to the
decision maker (spokesperson). Just as with the pun-
ishment frequency, we cannot analyze the main treat-
ment (voluntary delegation with independent pun-
ishment) while controlling for communication style.
Again the reason is that, in ourmain treatment, all DMs
choose the rational need message and all SPs choose
the emotional regret message. Hence, we pool the data
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Need NeedRegret Regret
Ind punish Same punish
Decision maker Spokesperson
Notes. This figure shows receivers’ average punishment response
to the expression of rational need messages and emotional regret
messages by the communication source and style for each punish-
ment form. All light-gray bars plot the average punishment amount
assigned to the decision maker, and the dark-gray bars refer to the
spokesperson. The sample is restricted to unfair allocations.
over communication source and style for (respectively)
independent punishment and same punishment.
Under independent punishment (left side of Fig-
ure 2), delegating communication does not change
either the decision maker’s punishment (p  0.9005 for
emotional regret, p  0.5379 for rational need) or the
spokesperson’s punishment (p  0.6611 for emotional
regret, p  0.6021 for rational need).19 When controlling
for the style of communication, we cannot confirm that
the source of communication (DM versus SP) affects
punishment amounts under independent punishment.
Under same punishment (right side of Figure 2),
delegating communication again has no effect on the
amounts by which decision maker and spokesper-
son are penalized. When we control for communi-
cation style (emotional versus rational), the punish-
ment amounts differ little irrespective of delegation
(p  0.3437 for emotional regret, p  0.7801 for ratio-
nal need).20 Thus, while controlling for communication
style, we cannot confirm (under same punishment) that
the delegation/source of communication affects pun-
ishment amounts.
Result 1. The messenger does not affect punishment meted
out by receivers because the latter do not view the delegation
of communicating an unfair allocation as an attempt to shift
blame.
3.2. Receivers’ Punishment of the
Style of Communication
How do receivers respond to a decision maker’s or
spokesperson’s expression of emotional regret or ratio-
nal need? Whereas rational need may alter receivers’
perceptions of fairness, emotional regret acknowledges
(albeit indirectly) that unfair allocations are socially
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unacceptable. If these are the only two styles of com-
munication, then we should expect no differences
in the responses to either expression under inde-
pendent versus same punishment. However, punish-
ment responses may differ under the two punishment
forms if receivers account for the context in which
a message is chosen and thus for the communica-
tor’s intention: expressing emotional regret can be per-
ceived as an irresponsible attempt to shift blame under
independent punishment but not under same punish-
ment (since blame cannot be shifted in the latter form).
3.2.1. Receivers’ Punishment Frequency: Communi-
cation Style. Under independent punishment, signifi-
cantly more receivers are willing to give up e1 to pun-
ish after receiving the emotional regret message (70%,
39 of 56) than after the rational need message (44%,
31 of 70) (p  0.007). Under same punishment, there is
little difference in the percentage of receivers punish-
ing in response to the emotional regret message (55%,
33 of 60) and in response to the rational need message
(52%, 43 of 82) (p  0.865).
Analogously to the analysis of delegation, here, we
must control for themessenger to disentangle the effect
of how the unfair allocation is communicated from who
communicates it.21 The difference between the punish-
ment frequencies in response to expressions of emo-
tional regret (75%, 6 of 8) versus rational need (41%, 23
of 56) is slightly insignificant when DMs communicate
directly (p  0.127). This might be attributed to the low
number of observations for the expression of emotional
regret. Communication style has little effect when SPs
serve as the messenger: 69% (33 of 48) of receivers pun-
ish after the emotional regretmessage and 57% (8 of 14)
after the rational need message (p  0.524).
We find that differences in the punishment fre-
quencies for emotional regret versus rational need are
smaller under same punishment. Those frequencies
are, respectively, 65% (13 of 20) versus 52% (23 of 44) for
decision makers (p  0.420) and 50% (20 of 40) versus
53% (20 of 38) for spokespersons (p  0.825). The only
exception of significance is the control treatment volun-
tary delegation with same punishment when the DM
chooses not to delegate communication of the unfair
allocation: 75% (9 of 12) and 36% (5 of 14) of receivers
punish after the decision maker expresses emotional
regret and rational need, respectively (p  0.062).
3.2.2. Receivers’ Punishment Intensity: Communica-
tion Style. The patterns of punishment amounts (in-
tensity) are similar to those of punishment frequen-
cies. Receivers view the expression of rational need and
emotional regret differently depending on the punish-
ment form. Here, we describe the effect of the commu-
nication style while controlling for the communication
source: decision maker or delegated spokesperson.
Under independent punishment, we find overall that
the expression of emotional regret is perceived as a
cowardly way to avoid responsibility and shift blame.
The emotional regretmessage is always punishedmore
than is the rational need message. Pooling all three
treatments in which punishment is independent, we
find that—on average—receivers reduce DM (SP) earn-
ings by e1.23 (e0.90) after a rational need message
and by e2.03 (e1.45) after an emotional regret message
(p  0.0045 for the DM’s punishment, p  0.0116 for the
SP’s punishment; two-sided Mann–Whitney U tests).
Under same punishment, neither DM nor SP seems
to mollify fairness objections (by expressing a ratio-
nal need) or to acknowledge unfairness (by express-
ing emotional regret). Pooling all three treatments that
incorporate same punishment, we find that receivers
punish decision maker and spokesperson by (on aver-
age) e1.49 after a rational need message and by e1.58
after an emotional regret message (p  0.5308; two-
sided Mann–Whitney U test).
If we pool all three treatments with independent
punishment and require that the DMbe themessenger,
then receivers punish the decision maker (spokesper-
son) by, on average, e1.21 (e0.88) after a rational need
message and by e2.00 (e1.56) after an emotional regret
message. The difference is statistically significant only
for spokespersons (p  0.0697 for the SP’s punishment;
p  0.1349 for the DM’s punishment; two-sided Mann–
Whitney U tests). Note again, that the number of obser-
vations for the emotional regretmessage (eight) is quite
small. If communication is delegated to the spokesper-
son, then receivers punish the DM (SP) by, on average,
e1.32 (e1.00) after a rational need message and by e2.03
(e1.43) after an emotional regret message. However,
these differences are insignificant (p  0.1558 for the
DM’s punishment, p  0.3153 for the SP’s punishment;
two-sided Mann–Whitney U tests).
When we pool all three treatments with same pun-
ishment and again require the DM to communicate
the unfair allocation choice, then receivers punish
the decision maker and spokesperson by (on aver-
age) e1.47 after a rational need message and by e1.85
after an emotional regret message (p  0.2546; two-
sided Mann–Whitney U test). If instead the spokesper-
son serves as messenger, then the average punish-
ment amounts are e1.53 after a rational need message
and e1.44 after an emotional regret message—once
again, an insignificant difference (p  0.9783; two-sided
Mann–Whitney U test). The only exception is when
the DM voluntarily communicates; in this case, expres-
sions of emotional regret are punished more heavily
than are expressions of rational need (treatment with
voluntary delegation and same punishment but with-
out delegation; p  0.0761; two-sided Mann–Whitney
U test). Thus, it seems that receivers view the expres-
sion of emotional regret negatively.22
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To address the problem of small numbers of ob-
servations (in particular when the DM communi-
cates emotional regret in treatments with indepen-
dent punishment), we employ regression analysis.
In Appendix B, we report so-called seemingly unre-
lated regression (SUR; treatments with independent
punishment) and ordinary least-squares (OLS; treat-
ments with same punishment) regression results with
punishment amount/intensity as the dependent vari-
able. Under independent punishment, the amount by
which decision maker and spokesperson are punished
increases significantly with delegation or with the
expression of emotional regret. A SUR regression with
both explanatory variables indicates that it is the
style—not the source—of communication that drives
the increase in punishment. OLS regressions of the
punishment amount (taking values between e0 and
e3.50 in discrete e0.5 increments) show that, under
same punishment, the amount of punishment does not
change with the delegation of communication or with
the communication style.
Result 2. If the expression of emotional regret can be viewed
as an irresponsible attempt to shift blame, receivers increase
the punishment directed at DM and SP compared to the
expression of rational need.
3.3. Communication Styles
In this section, we study how the decision maker
and the spokesperson communicate the unfair alloca-
tion choice to receivers and how the chosen approach
(communication style) is affected by the spokesper-
son’s view of delegation. As described in Section 2.1,
one sentence for communicating the unfair allocation
expresses a rational need and the other expresses emo-
tional regret. The exact sentences, which are identical
for DM and SP except for the person (first or third), are
provided in Online Appendix E.
We find that decision makers and spokespersons
have a different communication approach: DMs tend
to express rational need, whereas SPs tend to express
emotional regret. Figure 3 displays, for each treat-
ment, the share of DMs (nondelegated communica-
tion) and SPs (delegated communication) who choose
the message expressing emotional regret when com-
municating the unfair allocation. When communica-
tion is not delegated, decision makers choose the sen-
tence expressing emotional regret in 19% (4 of 21)
and 21% (4 of 19) of the cases under independent
punishment and same punishment, respectively (treat-
ments with no delegation). Yet when communication
must be delegated, spokespersons choose the sentence
expressing emotional regret in 65% (13 of 20) and 52%
(11 of 21) of the cases under, respectively, indepen-
dent and same punishment (treatments with manda-
tory delegation). The communication styles adopted by
DM and SPB messengers differ significantly (p  0.004
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Notes. This figure plots the share of decision makers and spokesper-
sons who choose the emotional regret message when communicat-
ing an unfair choice. The left (right) side gives the results under inde-
pendent (same) punishment, and by treatment: no delegation (light-
gray bars) and voluntary or mandatory delegation (dark-gray bars).
under independent punishment, p  0.055 under same
punishment).
If the DM can choose whether or not to delegate
communication, then the form of punishment (and
the spokespersons’ view of the delegation) strongly
affects the communication style employed by decision
makers and spokespersons. Under independent pun-
ishment, none (0 of 11) of the DMs who voluntar-
ily communicate directly makes the emotional regret
appeal whereas all (11 of 11) SPs charged with com-
municating the unfair allocation in our main treatment
(voluntary delegation with independent punishment)
express emotional regret (p  0.000). However, under
same punishment, 46% (6 of 13) of the voluntarily non-
delegating DMs express emotional regret as compared
with 50% (9 of 18) of SPs in the control treatment volun-
tary delegation with same punishment (p  1.000). The
share of spokespersons who express emotional regret
in the main treatment with voluntary delegation and
independent punishment (100%) is significantly larger
than that for the treatment with mandatory delega-
tion and independent punishment (65%) (p  0.033).
Under same punishment, however, there is no differ-
ence: a 50% share in each of the treatments voluntary
delegation and mandatory delegation with same pun-
ishment (p  1.000). This finding shows that spokesper-
sons view the delegation of communication as an irre-
sponsible attempt to shift blame under independent
punishment.23
Result 3. Spokespersons more frequently choose the mes-
sage expressing emotional regret (so as to shift blame back to
the decision maker) if delegation can be viewed as an attempt
to shift blame.
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Together, our results establish the importance of the
context in which communication takes place. When
there is room for shifting the blame, we observe a
chain effect: First, spokespersons usually respond to
delegation by choosing to communicate the emotional
regret message and even more so if the decision maker
decides to delegate communication. Second, receivers
punish the expression of emotional regret with greater
frequency and intensity than they punish the expres-
sion of rational need.24 The particular bearer of bad
tidings has no effect on the punishment administered
when we control for the style (emotional or rational) of
communication.
4. Conclusion
Suppose that a decision maker makes a harsh deci-
sion and that this decision can be communicated to
the third person (i.e., the receiver) either directly by
the decision maker or via a spokesperson. In this set-
ting, is the receiver negatively affected by the deci-
sion and does the receiver react differently depending
on the messenger; that is, on who communicates the
bad news? Does the receiver react differently depend-
ing on how the decision is communicated? And is that
style of communication affected by the possibility of
relying on a spokesperson to communicate, say, an
unfair allocation? We use a laboratory experiment to
investigate these questions. The main results show that
what matters for the receivers’ punishment response is
not the source but rather the style of communication.
In a context where blame for an unfair decision can be
shifted from the decision maker to the spokesperson
(and vice versa), receivers punish expressions of emo-
tional regret more than expressions of rational need.
This effect seems to be sequential: the DM’s choice to
delegate communication affects the SP’s communica-
tion style, which in turn affects receivers’ punishment
responses.
Referring to a real-world example, our experiment
may model a manager–employee setting. We can say
that, regardless of whether themanager communicates
an unpopular decision directly or through a spokesper-
son, the reaction of employees depends crucially on
how they perceive the delegation itself. If manager
and spokesperson are closely linked and share possible
consequences, then employees might not react strongly
to the fact of delegation. Yet, if the manager delegates
a messenger to shift blame (despite being fully respon-
sible), then she should be aware that—depending on
how the spokesperson communicates that decision—
this strategy could backfire in the sense of provoking a
much stronger reaction from those who are negatively
affected by the decision.
For managers who would truly prefer to shift
responsibility, one effective approach is to delegate the
decision making itself (Bartling and Fischbacher 2012).
If decision rights are so valuable that managers resist
delegating them to a third party, then they will still be
held responsible for harsh decisions and their conse-
quences. However, spokespersons may be useful even
in this case because they allow managers to avoid the
emotional cost of communicating bad news. Devel-
oping accounts that justify delegation and controlling
the communication style of spokespersons are possi-
ble extensions that suggest some interesting paths for
future research.
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Appendix A. Treatment Comparison
Concerning receivers’ punishment of the messenger, our de-
sign allows us to compare the effect of different message
sources while holding the style of communication constant.
In the treatment with voluntary delegation and indepen-
dent punishment, we might find that receivers punish more
when the SP (rather than the decision maker) communicates
for two reasons: (1) it is the spokesperson, not the decision
maker, who communicates; and/or (2) the DM voluntarily
chooses delegation. To distinguish between these channels,
we run two control treatments—no delegation with indepen-
dent punishment and mandatory delegation with indepen-
dent punishment—in which the second of these channels
does not exist. We expect to find more and greater pun-
ishment when the SP, rather than the DM, communicates
allocations in the treatment with voluntary delegation and
independent punishment; we also expect more and greater
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punishment in the mandatory delegation with independent
punishment treatment than in the no delegation with inde-
pendent punishment treatment.
Employing a spokesperson could have the effect of (i) shift-
ing receivers’ attention to the SP (and thereby reducing
punishment of the DM), (ii) shifting blame to the SP (and
thereby increasing her punishment and reducing the DM’s
punishment), and/or (iii) being perceived as an irresponsi-
ble attempt to shift blame (and thereby increasing punish-
ment of the DM and SP both and in particular of the DM).
To identify whether delegated communication is viewed by
receivers as an attempt to shift blame, we run the three con-
trol treatments inwhich the second and third channels do not
exist: voluntary delegation with same punishment, no del-
egation with same punishment, and mandatory delegation
with same punishment. In these treatments, receivers can
punish both DM and SP but only to the same extent; hence,
receivers cannot apportion blame between those players. We
therefore expect to find no differences in punishment under
delegation in treatments with same punishment, but we do
expect to find differences—driven by channel (iii)—in pun-
ishment under delegation in treatments with independent
punishment.
We conjecture that the receiver punishes more severely
when either the decision maker or the spokesperson chooses
a message expressing emotional regret to communicate the
unfair allocation. Our experimental design allows us to com-
pare the effect of how the communicator (DM or SP) deliv-
ers the message. The voluntary delegation with indepen-
dent punishment treatment could confirm the conjecture
because (1) the expression of rational need blunts fairness
considerations (and hence reduces punishment); (2) receivers
view the expression of emotional regret as an acknowl-
edgment of the allocation’s unfairness (and hence increase
punishment); and/or (3) receivers view the expression of
emotional regret as simply a way to avoid responsibility
and as an irresponsible attempt to shift blame (and hence
increase punishment). To disentangle the effects of these
three channels, we again run the control treatments for
which the third channel does not exist (voluntary delega-
tion with same punishment, no delegation with same pun-
ishment, and mandatory delegation with same punishment).
We expect to find more and greater punishment—driven
by channel (3)—in response to the expression of emotional
regret (as compared with rational need) in all three treat-
ments with independent punishment, but we expect to find
no punishment differences in all three treatments with same
punishment.
If the spokesperson views delegated communication as
blame shifting, then she will more often choose a mes-
sage that expresses emotional regret, hoping thereby to shift
the blame back on the decision maker. In the treatment
with voluntary delegation and independent punishment, a
spokesperson who expresses emotional regret: (i) might be
uncomfortable communicating an unfair decision, in which
case expressing regret may seem more “natural” than rea-
soning; (ii) might be responding to the delegation decision
per se; and/or (iii) may perceive the delegation decision as
an attempt to shift blame.
By comparing the main treatment (voluntary delegation
with independent punishment) with the control treatment
in which delegation is required (mandatory delegation with
independent punishment), we can analyze the effect of the
decision to delegate communication. And by comparing the
main treatment with the control treatment in which blame
shifting is not possible (voluntary delegation with same pun-
ishment), we can study the effect of perceived motives for
delegating—here, an attempt to shift blame. So with channel
(iii) driving the style of communication, we expect to find
the expression of emotional regret (more often than rational
need) in the treatment with voluntary delegation and inde-
pendent punishment than in the treatment with mandatory
delegation and independent punishment or with voluntary
delegation and same punishment.
Appendix B. Receivers’ Punishment Amount
Figure B.1 shows receivers’ average punishment response
to the expression of rational need messages and emotional
regret messages for each treatment. All light-gray bars plot
the average punishment amount assigned to the decision
maker, and the dark-gray bars refer to the spokesperson).
To address the problem of small numbers of observations
(in particular when the DM communicates emotional regret
in treatments with independent punishment), we employ
regression analysis. Table B.1 reports so-called seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR) and ordinary least-squares (OLS)
regression results with punishment amount/intensity as the
dependent variable. In the treatmentswith independent pun-
ishment, the amounts by which the DM and SP are pun-
ished are not independent because the same receiver makes
two decisions. We address this issue by using multiequation
SUR models, which account for correlated errors in the two
regression models that use either Punishment amount-DM or
Punishment amount-SP as the dependent variable. In the treat-
ments with same punishment, each receiver makes only one
decision about the punishment amount (since DM and SP
must be punished equally in this treatment). We therefore
use a single punishment amount (for DM and SP both) as
dependent variables in our OLS regressions.
In regressions (S1a), (S2a), and (S3a), the dependent vari-
able is Punishment amount-DM; in regressions (S1b), (S2b),
and (S3b), the dependent variable is Punishment amount-SP;
and in regressions (R1)–(R3), both are dependent variables.
Hence, the relevant samples are from the treatments with
independent punishment in (S1a)–(S3b) or from the treat-
ments with same punishment in (R1)–(R3). The explanatory
variables are Delegation (an indicator set equal to 1 if the SP
communicates and to 0 otherwise), Voluntary delegation (set
to 1 only if the treatment entails voluntary delegation), the
interaction term between the previous two variables, and the
expression of Emotional regret (a dummy set to 1 for emo-
tional regret or to 0 for rational need). In addition, we control
for gender (male versus female), lab location (UAB versus
UV), age, age-squared, and a dummy for “economics” as the
participant’s field of study.
Under independent punishment, the amount by which
decision maker and spokesperson are punished increases
significantly with delegation or with the expression of emo-
tional regret; see the results for regressions (S1a) and (S1b)
and for (S2a) and (S2b), respectively. The variables Delega-
tion and Emotional regret are highly correlated (Spearman’s
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Figure B.1. Punishment Amounts by Treatment
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Notes. This figure shows receivers’ average punishment response to the expression of rational need messages and emotional regret messages
for each treatment. All light-gray bars plot the average punishment amount assigned to the decision maker, and the dark-gray bars refer to the
spokesperson. The sample is restricted to unfair allocations.
rho 0.6532, p  0.000), which explains whymost of the coef-
ficients estimated in models (S3a) and (S3b) are insignificant.
Although the coefficient for the DM’s punishment amount
is both positive and significant in model (S3a), this indicates
that it is the style—not the source—of communication that
Table B.1. Punishment Amount
SUR 1 SUR 2 SUR 3 OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3
Punish Punish Punish Punish Punish Punish Punish Punish Punish
DM SP DM SP DM SP DM/SP DM/SP DM/SP
Variables (S1a) (S1b) (S2a) (S2b) (S3a) (S3b) (R1) (R2) (R3)
Delegation 0.622∗ 0.309 0.221 0.0731 −0.296 −0.365
(0.351) (0.303) (0.399) (0.347) (0.355) (0.365)
Vol del −0.0805 −0.521 0.0231 −0.460 −0.0461 −0.0874
(0.426) (0.367) (0.423) (0.367) (0.436) (0.435)
Delegation× 0.122 0.631 −0.303 0.381 0.344 0.394
Vol del (0.603) (0.520) (0.630) (0.548) (0.578) (0.580)
Emotional 0.883∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗ 0.852∗∗ 0.502 0.183 0.239
regret (0.294) (0.257) (0.423) (0.368) (0.289) (0.298)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 142 142 142
R2 0.056 0.096 0.081 0.096 0.086 0.110 0.033 0.029 0.037
Notes. This table reports the seemingly unrelated regressions from columns (S1a)–(S3b) about punishment amount with Independent punish-
ment; and OLS regressions from columns (R1)–(R3) about punishment amount with the same punishment. Coefficient estimates are shown for
SUR in (S1a)–(S3b) (standard errors in parentheses) and OLS in (R1)–(R3) (robust standard errors in parentheses). The dependent variables
Punish DM, Punish SP, and Punish DM/SP take values between 0 and 3.5. Punish DM (SM) is the punishment amount the receiver assigns to the
decision maker (spokesperson) with independent punishment, Punish DM/SP is the punishment amount the receiver assigns to the decision
maker and the spokesperson with same punishment. Control variables are a dummy for female, a dummy for observation from Valencia,
a dummy for economics as studies, age, and age-squared. Constant not reported. Sample are unfair allocations of treatments Vol del–Ind
punish, No del–Ind punish, and Man del–Ind punish for regressions (S1a)–(S3b) and unfair allocations of treatments Vol del–Same punish,
No del–Same punish, and Man del–Same Punish for regressions (R1)–(R3).
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
drives the increase in punishment. Note also that the coef-
ficient estimates of the variable Emotional regret are almost
the same for the DM (SP) controlling for the communica-
tor; see (S2a) and (S3a) ((S2b) and (S3b)). However, compared
to (S1a) and (S1b), the coefficient estimates of the variable
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Delegation in (S3a) and (S3b) are substantially smaller once
we control for Emotional regret. This underlines that it is the
communication style and not the delegation itself that drives
punishment.
Our OLS regressions of the punishment amount (taking
values between e0 and e3.50 in discrete e0.5 increments)
show that, under same punishment, the amount of punish-
ment does not change with the delegation of communica-
tion or with the communication style: regressions (R1) and
(R2), respectively, in Table B.1. The correlation between the
Delegation and Emotional regret variables (Spearman’s rho 
0.2018, p  0.001) is also weaker under same than under inde-
pendent punishment.
Appendix C. Decision Makers’ Allocation Choice
and Delegation of Communication
In the experiment’s first step, the DM decides how to allo-
cate the initial endowment. There are only two choices: fair
allocation (e5 each to all four group members) and unfair
allocation (e9 each to decision maker and spokesperson, e1
to the receivers).
Table C.1 reports the shares of unfair and fair allocations in
the main and control treatments. In the main treatment (vol-
untary delegationwith independent punishment), 49% of the
DMs choose the unequal split and 51% choose the egalitar-
ian split. In contrast, under voluntary delegation with same
punishment, we find that decision makers make significantly
more unfair choices (72%) (p  0.031).
In the voluntary delegation treatments, we find only one
significant difference in allocation choice: whereas about half
(49%, 22 of 45) of the decision makers under voluntary dele-
gation with independent punishment choose the unfair allo-
cation, nearly three-fourths (72%, 31 of 43) do so under vol-
untary delegation with same punishment (p  0.031). All
other pairwise allocation comparisons between treatments
are insignificant.25 We can only speculate concerningwhy the
form of punishment affects allocation choices under volun-
tary delegation. However, it is worth noting that, when the
spokesperson communicates the allocation (treatments with




treatments (134 of 217) (83 of 217)
Main Voluntary Independent 49% 51%
treatment delegation punishment (22 of 45) (23 of 45)
No Independent 64% 36%
delegation punishment (21 of 33) (12 of 33)
Mandatory Independent 63% 37%
delegation punishment (20 of 32) (12 of 32)
Control Voluntary Same 72% 28%
treatments delegation punishment (31 of 43) (12 of 43)
No Same 59% 41%
delegation punishment (19 of 32) (13 of 32)
Mandatory Same 66% 34%
delegation punishment (21 of 32) (11 of 32)
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Note. In this figurewe report—for voluntary delegation treatments—
the percentage of communication delegated: by punishment form
(independent or same) and allocation choice (fair or unfair).
mandatory delegation), the resulting avoidance of shame and
emotional distress—and the possibility of reduced punish-
ment from receivers’ shifted attention—do not lead to more
unfair allocation decision (compared to treatments with no
delegation).
Not surprisingly, decision makers delegate communica-
tion of the unfair allocation more often than that of the
fair allocation. We use data from the treatments voluntary
delegation with same punishment and voluntary delega-
tion with independent punishment, where DMs can choose
whether or not to delegate communication to a spokesperson.
In both treatments, we observe a significant positive relation-
ship between allocation unfairness and delegated commu-
nication. The left (right) side of Figure C.1 plots the share
of DMs under voluntary delegation with independent pun-
ishment (voluntary delegation with same punishment) who
delegate communication after having chosen the fair or the
unfair allocation. Among the DMs choosing the fair allo-
cation, only 17% (4 of 23) and 25% (3 of 12)—under inde-
pendent and same punishment, respectively—delegate com-
munication of that choice to the SP. Yet, for those DMs
who choose the unfair allocation, the percentage of dele-
gators more than doubles: 50% (11 of 22) under voluntary
delegation with independent punishment, and 58% (18 of
31) under voluntary delegation with same punishment. This
relation between fairness and delegation is statistically sig-
nificant (p  0.029 under voluntary delegation with indepen-
dent punishment, p  0.088 under voluntary delegation with
same punishment).
We also perform a regression analysis of the allocation
and delegation choices. In the treatments voluntary delega-
tion with independent punishment and voluntary delega-
tion with same punishment, the choice of allocation and the
choice of delegation are not independent because the data
come from the same subjects; that is, a given decision maker
makes both decisions. To overcome this limitation, we use
SUR models with multiple equations that account for cor-
related errors in the two regressions by using the allocation
decision and the delegation decision as dependent variables.
For the control treatments with no delegation or mandatory
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Table C.2. SUR of Allocation and Communication Delegation (S1a)–(S4b) and OLS of Allocation (R1)–(R2)
SUR 1 SUR 2 SUR 3 SUR 4 OLS 1 OLS 2
Unfair all Delegation Unfair all Delegation Unfair all Delegation Unfair all Delegation Unfair all Unfair all
Variables (S1a) (S1b) (S2a) (S2b) (S3a) (S3b) (S4a) (S4b) (R1) (R2)
Ind punish −0.232∗∗ −0.0761 −0.237∗∗ −0.0707 −0.224∗ −0.155 −0.256∗∗ −0.156 0.0426 0.0155
(0.101) (0.164) (0.0990) (0.166) (0.126) (0.104) (0.122) (0.105) (0.123) (0.123)
Unfair all 0.331∗∗ 0.368∗∗
(0.156) (0.160)
Ind punish× −0.00456 0.00306
Unfair all (0.208) (0.207)
Delegation 0.266∗ 0.249∗ 0.0625 0.0392
(0.137) (0.130) (0.123) (0.118)
Ind punish× 0.100 0.172 −0.0739 −0.0434
Delegation (0.198) (0.187) (0.173) (0.171)
Constant 0.721∗∗∗ 0.250∗ 2.475∗∗ −0.0800 0.591∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 2.214∗ 0.832 0.594∗∗∗ 0.847
(0.0725) (0.133) (1.219) (1.250) (0.0959) (0.0740) (1.139) (1.288) (0.0882) (0.641)
Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 129 129
R2 0.056 0.126 0.145 0.171 0.156 0.025 0.257 0.055 0.002 0.07
Notes. Coefficient estimates are shown for SUR in (S1a)–(S4b) (standard errors in parentheses) and OLS in (R1)–(R2) (robust standard errors
in parenthesis). The dependent variable Unfair all takes the value 1 for the unfair allocation choice and 0 for the fair allocation choice. The
dependent variable Delegation takes the value 1 for delegated communication and 0 if the DM communicates. Control variables are a dummy
for female, a dummy for observation from Valencia, and a dummy for economics studies, age, and age-squared (all insignificant, except for the
positive coefficient estimate for economics studies in regression models (S3a) and (S4a)). Sample is treatments Vol del–Same punish and Vol
del–Ind punish for regressions (S1a)–(S4b), and treatments No del–Same punish, Man del–Same punish, No del–Ind punish, and Man del–Ind
punish for regressions (R1) and (R2).
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
delegation, we use OLS estimation because DMs decide only
on the allocation when, as in these treatments, the delegation
is assigned exogenously.
Table C.2 reports results from the seemingly unrelated and
OLS regressions of allocation and communication delega-
tion. The dependent variable Unfair all takes the value 1 for
the unfair allocation choice and 0 for the fair allocation choice.
The dependent variable Delegation takes the value 1 for del-
egated communication and 0 if the decision maker commu-
nicates. Control variables for individual characteristics are a
dummy for female, a dummy for lab location, and a dummy
for economics studies, age, and age-squared. The sample is
treatments voluntary delegation with independent punish-
ment and voluntary delegation with same punishment for
regressions (S1a)–(S4b), and treatments no delegation with
independent punishment, mandatory delegation with inde-
pendent punishment, no delegation with same punishment,
andmandatory delegationwith same punishment for regres-
sions (R1) and (R2).
Models (S1a)–(S4b) regress the allocation and delegation
decision on a dummy variable for independent punishment
(Ind punish—value 1 for independent punishment, 0 for same
punishment). In the model of the delegation decision (S1b),
the variableUnfair all (1 for unfair and 0 for fair) and an inter-
action term between Ind punish and Unfair all are added and
the variable Unfair all is treated as if it was exogenous. Mod-
els (S2a)–(S2b) perform the same regressions as (S1a)–(S1b)
adding the before mentioned control variables. In the model
of the allocation decision (S3a), the variable Delegation (1 for
delegated communication, 0 otherwise) and an interaction
term between Ind punish and Delegation are added and the
variable Delegation is treated as if it was exogenous. Mod-
els (S4a)–(S4b) perform the same regressions as (S3a)–(S3b),
adding the before-mentioned control variables.
Results confirm that the Unfair allocation choice by the
decision maker is about 24% points less likely in treatment
voluntary delegation with independent punishment than
in treatment voluntary delegation with same punishment.
The regression results show also that the unfair allocation
choice and the delegation of communication are positively
correlated. We fail to reject the null hypothesis “difference
in the delegation frequency of unfair allocations between
same punishment and independent punishment” because
the interaction terms in (S1b) and (S2b) are not significantly
different from zero. The positive and significant coefficient
estimates for the variable Unfair allocation in (S1b) and (S2b)
and for the variable Delegation in (S3a) and (S4a) cannot be
interpreted as causal effects since both variables are in fact
endogenous.
In the OLS regression models, the variableUnfair allocation
is regressed on the dummy variable Independent punishment,
the dummy variable Delegation for (exogenously) delegated
communication and an interaction term of the two explana-
tory variables. The coefficient estimates of both the dummy
variable Independent punishment and the interaction term are
not significantly different from zero.
In summary, we obtain evidence that fairness of allocation
is explained by the decision makers’ expectations about how
receivers will view communication of that allocation being
delegated—and not by the possibility of shifting attention
(and blame). Although delegating communication may be
viewed as an irresponsible attempt to shift blame under inde-
pendent punishment (where DM and SP do not share the
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consequences of responsibility and blame), that interpreta-
tion does not arise under same punishment (where DM and
SP do share those consequences). Nonetheless, our results
provide evidence that decision makers are more inclined to
delegate communication after choosing the unfair allocation,
thereby avoiding emotional distress.
Endnotes
1Bies (2012) shows that business leaders consider the communica-
tion of bad news to be one of their most difficult activities.
2For a similar example, see Chafkin (2007).
3Erat (2013) reports that a significant proportion of experimental
subjects use an agent for the purpose of delivering false informa-
tion (i.e., to lie). Moreover, the likelihood of delegating such a task
depends on the extent of harm; that is, delegation increases with the
harm to be suffered by the receiver.
4 If the decision maker chooses the unfair split, then whoever (DM
or SP) communicates that decisionmust choose one of twomessages:
one expressing emotional regret or one expressing rational need.
5Three models help us understand how affected individuals may
react to an unfair allocation. First, self-interested payoff maximiz-
ers for whom punishment is costly will not surrender any of their
earnings to punish an unfair decision. Second, if the affected indi-
viduals have social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) and behave
in accordance with reciprocity (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004),
then they might punish an unfair allocation even if doing so is costly.
Third, if those affected view the DM’s choice in terms of responsibil-
ity, then they will punish an unfair decision and the person consid-
ered responsible for that decision (Bartling and Fischbacher 2012).
6 If expressing rational need addresses the fairness concerns of
receivers or emotional regret acknowledges the unfairness of the
allocation choice, then we should expect the resultant outcomes to
be the same under both independent punishment and same pun-
ishment. Therefore, treatment differences across the form of punish-
ment (independent versus same) cannot be explained by changes in
fairness attitudes (expression of rational need) or the acknowledge-
ment of the unfairness (emotional regret).
7No player is informed about any other player’s identity (before,
during, or after the experiment).
8The “you’d do it, too” aspect of the rational need message can be
interpreted as highlighting the experiment’s random assignment of
participant roles and/or as encouraging receivers to put themselves
in the shoes of the decision maker. The emotional regret messages’
lack of any such additional connotations should not be perceived
as compromising our design because we are mainly interested in
comparisons between main and control treatments.
9We use a fixed punishment fee because we want the punishment
amount to be affected not by its cost but instead by the variables
described in Section 2.2.
10Starting in the summer, we encountered difficulties running ses-
sions at UAB because most students were on break and there were
technical issues with the recruitment system. We therefore ran some
sessions at UV and tried to obtain a balanced number of observations
(by treatment) from the two schools, thereby minimizing treatment
effects due to different subject pools and/or locations. We control for
location in all the regressions.
11We use a postexperiment questionnaire to collect such personal
details as age, gender, and education of participants (grouped into
the following fields: economics, psychology, sociology, languages,
medicine, computer science, and “other”). Among all participants,
38% study economics, 56% are women, and the average age is
about 24.
12The number of observations from UAB (UV) for each treatment
is 23 (22) groups for voluntary delegation with independent pun-
ishment, 13 (20) groups for no delegation with independent pun-
ishment, 12 (20) groups for mandatory delegation with indepen-
dent punishment, 21 (22) groups for voluntary delegation with
same punishment, 12 (20) groups for no delegation with same pun-
ishment, and 12 (20) groups for mandatory delegation with same
punishment.
13See Bartling and Fischbacher (2012). Overall, 12% (20 of 166) of the
receivers punish when the decision maker chooses the fair allocation
and 54% (146 of 268) of them punish an unfair allocation reveal-
ing inequality aversion (p  0.000, all receivers; p < 0.036 for each
treatment separately). The low share of receivers punishing a fair
allocation would preclude their analysis—even if we were not more
interested, which we are, in punishment for unfair allocations.
14Pooling the three treatments with independent punishment
(i.e., voluntarydelegation, nodelegation, andmandatorydelegation).
15For the pooled treatments with independent punishment (i.e., vol-
untary delegation, mandatory delegation, and no delegation).
16 p  0.409 for emotional regret, p  1.000 for rational need;
pooled treatments with same punishment (i.e., voluntary delegation,
mandatory delegation, and no delegation).
17 In themain treatment, voluntarydelegationwith independentpun-
ishment, receivers (on average) punish the DM by e1.51 and the SP
by e0.96; this difference is statistically significant also (p  0.003; two-
sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Separate analyses of the treatment
with independentpunishment—voluntarydelegationwithandwith-
out delegation, no delegation, and mandatory delegation—yield a
similar picture: in each case, the DM’s punishment exceeds the SP’s
punishment (p < 0.0605; two-sidedWilcoxon signed-rank tests).
18Weobtain similar resultswhennonpunishing receivers are excluded.
First, DMs are punishedmore strongly than are SPs (especially under
voluntary delegation or in response to emotional regret accounts):
voluntary delegation and rational need, p  0.029; voluntary delega-
tion and emotional regret, p  0.049; no delegation and emotional
regret, p  0.086; mandatory delegation and emotional regret, p 
0.012 (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). Second, SPs are pun-
ished significantly less under independent punishment (e2.06) than
under samepunishment (e2.86) (p  0.001; two-sidedMann–Whitney
U tests). For decision makers there are no differences: e2.85 under
independent punishment and e2.86 under same punishment.
19Pooled treatments voluntary delegation, mandatory delegation,
and no delegation (all with independent punishment); p > 0.6000 for
each communication style with exogenous delegation and for DM
and SP separately; two-sided Mann–Whitney U tests.
20Pooled treatments voluntary delegation, mandatory delegation,
and no delegation (all with same punishment); p > 0.3160 for each
communication style and form—i.e., voluntary versus exogenous
delegation—separately; two-sided Mann–Whitney U tests.
21Because all decision makers (spokespersons) choose the rational
need (emotional regret) message in our main treatment, we once
again pool all treatments that incorporate independent punishment
and all treatments that incorporate same punishment.
22 It could be argued that, in this case, the decisionmaker seemsmoti-
vated to reduce her responsibility for choosing the unfair allocation.
23We can only speculate about what drives the differences (among
decisionmakers) in communication style. The different styles of DMs
in the treatments voluntary delegation with independent or same
punishment could reflect self-selection or could be strategic.
24Further determinants of punishment are inequality aversion,
responsibility for the allocation choice, and the receivers’ perception
of the communicator’s intention—and not the communication’s style
itself, delegation of communication, or receivers’ views on delegated
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communication. Decision makers are not able to shift the blame for
their unfair allocation choice onto the spokesperson.
25The differences among control treatments in the share of unfair
allocations are not statistically significant: mandatory delegation ver-
sus no delegation, p  0.856; mandatory delegation with same pun-
ishment versus no delegation with same punishment, p  0.797;
mandatory delegation with independent punishment versus no del-
egation with independent punishment, p  1.000; mandatory delega-
tion with same punishment versus mandatory delegation with inde-
pendent punishment, p  1.000. In all cases, we use the two-sided
Fisher’s exact test.
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